I’ve been reading Coppleston’s History of Philosophy, specifically the first volume detailing some of the Pre-Socratics. I’ve just read the section on Parmenides and Melissus and came across the concept of “the infinite” again.
Melissus takes issue with Parmenides’s concept of being. Parmenides said that Being is finite (spacially, according to Coppleston), but Melissus argues that Being is infinite, for to be finite is to be limited by something else. But outside of Being, this “something else”, there is nothing at all. So how can nothing limit Being? We must say that Being is, literally, limited by nothing. Therefore Being must be infinite, contrary to Parmenides’s opinion.
This same sort of concept of the infinite comes up again in Modern Philosophy with Spinoza, who argues that substance is not only independent (by definition), but infinite (Ethics, Proposition VIII). Roughly, this is because if it were not infinite, it would be finite, which is to be limited by something. Not only limited by something, but something of its own kind, which is to say this “limiting thing” must share an attribute with the thing it’s limiting. But this is absurd, since in Spinoza’s philosophy no two substances can share the same attribute (Ethics, Proposition V). Therefore, he says, substance must be not only =def independent, but also infinite.
These seem to be the same definitions of “the infinite”, namely:
Something is infinite =def when it is not limited by anything.
This is a rough definition, but in each argument something more specifically like the following is posited:
Something is infinite =def when it is not limited by any second thing.
On first glance this appears to be the same as the first definition. If it appears that way to you, then good, I am just at the point where I can reveal my question: Is it possible for something to limit itself? Put another way, is it possible, without any second thing, for something to limit itself?
It seems that we would have to answer in the affirmative. Otherwise we might be lead to saying some pretty absurd things. For instance, when I say the table in front of me is finite, on this classic Melissus/Spinoza account I would have to be saying something like “This table is finite because it’s limited by some second thing”. Since we’re talking about a physical object, I look to what is closest to the table. The majority of the table is surrounded by air. So then am I saying something like this?:
“The table is finite because it’s limited by a second thing, namely, air”
But this seems not only strange, but wrong. The air isn’t really interacting with the table all that much. And it would also seem that by removing the air, or all other physical things around it, the table could somehow become infinite! This also seems ridiculous. I only can imagine a table free-floating out in space. And if some distant galaxy is all that is left to exist besides the table, then we would say the table is limited?
Maybe I’m not understanding these terms quite right, which is certainly possible. But if so, then I wish for a better definition of what it means to be infinite. And I would like an answer to my question, “is it possible for something, without any second thing, to be finite?”.